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Gabriella Hulsey: A Moral Evaluation of Calling Out: Why Calling Out is a Permissible and 
Valuable Practice  
 
(Under the direction of Sarah Stroud) 
 
 I consider the moral permissibility and value of the practice of calling out. I give a minimal 
definition of calling out that should be acceptable to critics and proponents of calling out. I 
consider an argument on which calling out is both permissible and has unique moral value as a 
mechanism for helping others improve morally. On this positive argument, calling out is 
valuable because it offers a way for us to help others improve morally. I also present an 
argument on behalf of critics of calling out, according to which calling out is too harmful for 
those being called out for calling out to be morally permissible. My project is a positive one: I 
conclude that because callouts function as moral education mechanisms, calling out plays a role 
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In 2018, popular knitwear designer Caitlin Hunter, who is white, came under fire for 
selling a sweater pattern named after the Shawnee chief and orator Tecumseh. Hunter was 
accused of profiting off of the name of an Indigenous person. A comment by Ravelry user Emily 
Gray sums up the critical reaction:   
Clearly the sweater is well crafted and well thought out — I have no criticism of the craft 
that went into the garment. However, as a white person who recognizes the systemic, 
generations-long oppression of Native People, I can’t abide by unacknowledged 
appropriation like this.1 
 
Here, Gray is criticizing Hunter for appropriating Tecumseh’s name for profit. In modern 
parlance, we would say that Gray called Hunter out. To call someone out is to publicly criticize 
them for a moral transgression. The standard critical gloss on calling out is that it’s a misguided 
form of armchair activism or thinly disguised mob rule (Radzik, 2020, 12). The philosophical 
literature on callouts generally reflects the popular discourse in tone as well as in substance. My 
project here is to examine the merits of the philosophical arguments. 
My focus is on the moral permissibility of calling out as a practice rather than on giving 
an account of what makes a particular callout morally permissible or not. “Calling out” is a 
(relatively) new name for an old practice.2 In what follows, I use contemporary cases of callouts 
 
1 Quoted with permission of Emily Gray. Ravelry does not record exact date and time comments are published. Link 
to comment (comment number 32): https://www.ravelry.com/patterns/library/tecumseh-2/comments?page=2 - 32.  
 
2 My layperson’s view of history is that there are good historical candidates for calling out, such as the speeches of 
religious and political prisoners prior to execution, or even Martin Luther nailing his theses to the church door. But I 
would need to think more about it.   
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occurring in Western contexts as paradigmatic examples of the target practice, but my analysis is 
not limited to those contexts.  
Plan for Paper 
Before going further, I want to introduce the three parties involved in a callout: the 
person calling out, the person being called out, and witnesses to the callout. The person calling 
out is the Caller. The person being called out is the Callee. And those who witness the callout are 
the audience.3 In the example above, Gray is the Caller, Hunter is the Callee, and other Ravelry 
users fill out the audience. 
In what follows, I consider arguments for and against the practice of calling out. My 
project is positive: I argue that calling out is morally permissible and morally valuable. Section 2 
covers my minimal definition of calling out and distinguishes calling out from three adjacent 
practices. In Section 3, I argue that callouts are morally valuable as a moral education 
mechanism; two objections are raised, and replies considered. In Section 4, I present an 
argument, which I later reject, that the harms of callouts outweigh any benefits they may confer. 
In Section 5, I explain that calling out is a morally valuable practice because it allows people 
who are usually silenced to harness the ampliative power of the audience’s endorsement so that 
their moral criticisms reach the Callee. 
 
2 Calling Out: What It Is and Is Not  
 
Wherever we stand on the moral permissibility of calling out, there are three essential 
features for any definition of the practice of calling out:   
 






1.  Callouts Contain a Negative Moral Judgment: Callouts assert a negative moral 
judgment. The moral judgment attaches to a specific action which (allegedly) 
instantiates a moral transgression. By “moral transgression,” I mean that the action 
violated a moral norm.  
 
2. Calling Out is Public: Callouts are performed in public and have an audience. The 
presence of an audience is crucial to the benefits and the harms of calling out. The 
minimum audience size is one person (who is not the Caller or the Callee). In 
general, the larger the audience is, the more potent the callout will be (for better or 
worse).  
 
3. Calling Out is a Public Practice of Moral Criticism: Calling out involves more 
than the assertion of a negative moral judgment, as described in the first feature. 
The assertion must be addressed to the person who performed the transgressive 
action. This is what turns the assertion of a negative moral judgment into a moral 
criticism.  
 
Before looking at what calling out is not, I want to summarize the positive argument I make in 
the rest of the paper: I suggest that callouts convey a certain sort of information to the Callee. 
The information conveyed is about, or relevant to, the moral permissibility of the called-out 
action. Successful transmission and uptake of that information constitutes a sort of moral 






A Caveat  
I will make the simplifying assumption that the Caller knows she has accurately 
described the called-out action and has correctly identified the moral permissibility of the act-
type that the called-out action instantiates. Making this simplifying assumption lets me focus on 
whether callouts are morally valuable and permissible even in the best-case scenario.4 I hope the 
logic is clear: if calling out is morally impermissible and lacks distinct moral value even in the 
ideal case, then we may be able to settle the moral status of the practice without considering the 
non-ideal case. 
 
What Calling Out Is Not  
With this minimal definition, we can distinguish calling out from three other practices 
with which it is often confused. Calling out is not obviously incompatible with these other 
practices, so at the end of the Section, I’ll briefly consider what it means for our analysis when a 
callout co-occurs with one of these other practices.  
 
Public Shaming  
To publicly shame someone is to publicly identify them as a wrongdoer, thus holding 
them up for public scrutiny, ridicule, and reproach. Public shaming involves implicit or explicit 
assertions about the kind of person the shamed is. This is in contrast with guilt, which Thomason 
says is focused on specific actions. When I feel guilty, I feel bad about something I did. When I 
 





feel shame, I feel bad about who I am (Thomason, 2018, 11). This is one among many 
interpretations of what is distinctive about shame, but I think it captures how shame is invoked 
when callouts are derided as a practice of public shaming. Cases of public shaming are striking 
because the initial shamer invites the audience to render their own global judgment of the 
Callee’s character solely in light of that for which she is shamed. The shamed person comes to be 
defined by this single dimension of her character. Especially in the social media age, calling out 
may be confused with public shaming if we fail to appreciate the differential scope of the 
judgments made in cases of public shaming versus those made when someone is called out. 
Calling out focuses on an instantiation of a moral transgression, so the Caller’s judgment about 
the Callee’s character is paradigmatically local, not global.  
 
Punishment 
Calling out is often framed as a punitive practice. If calling out is punitive, then standard 
accounts of punishment are of no help because standard accounts concern formal, legal 
punishment. If calling out is a practice of punishment, it is not formal or legal punishment. Linda 
Radzik’s account of informal social punishment is well-suited to help us make sense of the 
notion that callouts are punitive. Radzik gives four criteria for a harm to constitute punishment.5 
The harm must be imposed in reaction to a transgression, be reprobative, be intentionally 
imposed, and imposed by someone with the requisite authority.6 Those who frame calling out as 
 
5 It’s worth noting that Radzik’s criteria are derived from a definition of formal punishment. See Radzik (2019, 11 
and 15) 
 
6 Radzik does not argue that callouts are informal social punishments. She distinguishes moral criticism from 
informal social punishments by noting that informal social punishments involve intentionally inflicting harm to 
express reprobation. In contrast, moral criticism may, but need not, involve intentional infliction of reprobative harm 





a punitive practice think the defining feature of calling out (understood as a punitive practice) is 
that the Caller intends to harm the Callee. On my minimal definition, a callout can satisfy 
Radzik’s four criteria. Often, we won’t be able to tell whether the Caller intended to harm the 
Callee. If the Caller intended to harm the Callee then, ceteris paribus, that would be a case of 
calling out and a case of informal social punishment. That these practices can co-occur does not 
mean they are identical.   
 
 
Moral Grandstanding  
Callouts are often derided as performative. One way this may be true is if callouts were 
cases of moral grandstanding. Moral grandstanding is an abuse of moral talk where the 
grandstander seeks to boost her moral credentials by making her peers think she is morally 
above-average. Moral grandstanding has two components: the grandstander desires to be 
recognized as morally above average, and she makes an expression (called the grandstanding 
expression) to secure that recognition (Tosi and Warmke, 2020, 15). Though the grandstander 
explicitly asserts a moral judgment about the moral issue she is responding to, her primary aim is 
to be seen by her peers as morally superior.  
Like the grandstander, the Caller desires a particular sort of uptake from hearers, and she 
may be disappointed if she fails to secure that uptake.7 However, the Caller seeks a different kind 
of uptake than the grandstander. The Caller’s aim is for the Callee to improve morally. The 
 
7 Since there are two distinct groups of hearers for the Caller (the Callee, and the audience), the Caller may desire a 






Caller desires uptake of the moral message: she wants the Callee to acknowledge the substance 
of the moral criticism.  
Tosi and Warmke suggest a heuristic for identifying grandstanders.8 If a person would be 
disappointed that she failed to secure uptake of the implicit message about her moral superiority, 
then that person was grandstanding. If we rely on that heuristic to identify cases of 
grandstanding, calling out will often be confused with grandstanding. The disappointment 
heuristic fails to distinguish the different types of disappointment that the Caller and the 
grandstander each feel. Where the Caller fails to secure uptake from the Callee, the Caller is 
disappointed that the hearers did not acknowledge or accept her moral judgment. We could say 
that the Caller is disappointed because the Callee did not recognize the moral superiority of the 
Caller’s moral judgment. When described that way, callouts may count as grandstanding on the 
disappointment heuristic. But while grandstander is disappointed on her own behalf, whereas the 
Caller is disappointed on behalf of what she thinks is the moral truth.  
I have not exhausted the argumentative resources for distinguishing callouts from other 
phenomena. I only tried to show that, on a minimal conception of calling out, we can distinguish 
between calling out from other, similar practices. Nothing I have said so far rules out cases 
where calling out co-occurs with these other practices. Before moving on, I want to briefly 
consider cases in which calling out co-occurs with one of these other practices.  
 
Hybrid Cases 
Informal social punishment seems most likely to co-occur with calling out. On Radzik’s 
 
8 Though they call grandstanding an abuse of moral talk, Tosi and Warmke say the grandstander may have more 





account, one goal the punisher may have is to help the punished improve morally. By imposing a 
punitive harm on the punished, the punisher aims to reduce the likelihood that the punished 
commits a similar transgression in the future. Informal social punishment does not explicitly aim 
to help the Callee improve morally by sharing moral information. The aim of informal social 
punishment is to help the Callee improve morally by giving her reasons to avoid similar 
transgressive in the future. Radzik also suggests that being punished may play a role in the 
Callee’s atonement for her moral transgressions. Punishment may also be a step in the process of 
the punished person’s reintegration into the moral community (Radzik, 2019, 58).  
The Caller may also aim to help the Callee improve morally. Thus, the goals of calling 
out may be compatible with the goals of punishment. Some examples of compatible goals are 
expressing moral disapproval, reaffirming the value of the moral norm that was violated, and 
decreasing the likelihood of similar moral transgressions going forward. In practice, what is 
required to accomplish the punisher’s goals seems liable to undermine the Caller’s goals. Unlike 
the punisher, the Caller aims to help the Callee improve morally by sharing moral information 
about or relevant to the moral permissibility of the called-out action. People typically react 
negatively to being harmed, and this natural reaction may distract from the substance of the 
criticism. Even if the Callee believes that she deserves to be punished, the unpleasant experience 
of being punished may obscure the moral information that the Caller aims to convey.  
It seems possible for the same communicative act to count as public shaming and as 
calling out. However, a communicative act that is intended to both shame publicly and to call out 
may not be particularly successful as an instance of either practice. The goal of public shaming is 
to make the perceived transgressor viscerally feel the force of their community’s disapproving 





moral judgments in cases of public shaming seems liable to make the community write off the 
Callee as a lost cause. If the Callee is written off, it makes it less likely that the audience will 
engage with the Callee as a moral equal. Among other things, this could have the undesirable 
effect of making the audience more likely to subject the Callee to abuse.  
Lastly, the communicative act of grandstanding and the communicative act of calling out 
seem to be incompatible. Grandstanders simply use another’s transgression as an opportunity to 
burnish her own moral credentials in the eyes of her peers. In contrast, callouts are focused on 
the moral qualities of the Callee. Grandstanding expressions are not about another person’s 
moral transgression in the way that callouts are about the called-out action. It seems difficult to 
craft a communicative act that accomplishes such a narrowly self-serving goal and disguises the 
narrow self-serving goal so that the Callee will be receptive to the moral criticism of the callout.   
My remarks on hybrid cases have been brief. I don’t have a robust sense of how the 
morally salient features of one practice interact with the morally salient feature of a co-occurring 
practice. But there are well-known objections to those other practices. In cases of co-occurrence, 
I am inclined to think that one practice would inherit the problems of the practice with which it 
co-occurs. The rest of this paper, unless otherwise stated, is about calling out in its pure, non-
hybrid form. If calling out is morally impermissible in the most straightforward and best-case 
scenario, then it is also impermissible in hybrid cases. As such, it makes sense to consider the 
permissibility of the practice in the best-case scenario first.  
 
3 An Argument for Calling Out: The Moral Education Argument 
There are two benefits that calling out may have which proponents of the practice think 





calling someone out can help them improve morally. The former benefit has received more 
attention, most notably in Billingham and Parr (2020). They argue that practices of public moral 
criticism like calling out are valuable because they reinforce the importance and value of moral 
norms. Public moral criticism involves a practice of public accountability, which helps to secure 
future compliance with the moral norms being reinforced (Billingham and Parr, 2020, 7).  
I think calling out can help reinforce moral norms, but I am more interested in how 
callouts help the Callee improve morally, which I think has been overlooked. In this Section, I 
will argue that calling out is a way to help the Callee improve morally because callouts can 
function as moral education mechanisms. The moral education function of callouts is what 
makes the practice uniquely morally valuable. To show this, I’ll consider two views about the 
informational content of callouts. Then I’ll present an argument for adopting the view on which 
callouts are items of factual testimony. I’ll explain how that view of their informational content 
helps us fully appreciate how callouts function as moral education mechanisms. I will also 
explain the importance of publicity to this moral education function. Last, I consider and reply to 
an objection against my positive argument.  
 
3.1 The Informational Content of Callouts: Two Views 
A normative analysis of calling out depends in part on what information callouts convey. 
Callouts help the Callee improve morally because callouts convey morally relevant information. 
The Caller aims to describe the called-out action and transmit that description, along with certain 
morally relevant information bearing on its permissibility, to the Callee. What sort of 
information the Caller aims to transmit depends on which view we adopt. I’ll consider two 





communicative project. On my view, the Caller’s communicative project is to help the Callee 
improve morally. To accomplish her communicative project, the Caller seeks to do two things. 
First, to describe the called-out action in such a way that the Callee can see that the called-out 
action is an instantiation of some act-type X. There are presumably lots of ways the called-out 
action could be described, not all of which make it clear that the called-out action is an 
instantiation of act-type X. But as long as the called-out action is aptly described as an instance 
of act-type X, even if other people would describe it differently, then that description is a 
legitimate one. Second, to give the Callee information about the moral permissibility of the 
called-out action information about or relevant to the moral permissibility of the act-type X.  
Next, I will look at two views of what sort of information callouts convey, each of which 
accomplishes these two aims in different ways. 
 
View 1: Moral Fact View 
One way of cashing out the Caller’s communicative project is that she aims to 
communicate moral facts to the Callee. By moral facts, I simply mean facts about the structure of 
morality or objective moral truths. Depending on your first-order moral view, the content of the 
facts could be the categorical imperative, or claims about prima facie duties or utility 
maximization. On the moral fact view, the Caller achieves her communicative aim by 
straightforwardly asserting two things. She asserts a description of the called-out action as an 
instantiation of the act-type X. And she asserts the moral proposition that acts which instantiate 
act-type X are morally impermissible. Consider the example from the Introduction. Gray said 
that “as a white person who recognizes the systemic, generations-long oppression of Native 





aims to communicate two things to Hunter. First, she aims to communicate that the called-out 
action is an instance of the act-type ‘cultural appropriation.’ Second, she asserts the moral fact 
that cultural appropriation is morally impermissible. Gray could draw on other sorts of 
information as well if doing so can help her case. For instance, it seems relevant to the 
description of Hunter’s action as an instantiation of cultural appropriation that Hunter is white. 
The factive nature of the second assertion does most of the heavy lifting in persuading the Callee 
to defer to the Caller’s assertion. The reason the Caller gives for why the Callee should defer to 
the assertion is that it is a moral fact that acts of type X are morally wrong.  
 
View 2: Morally Salient Information View 
On this view, calling out involves doing three things. As on the moral fact view, the 
Caller achieves her first communicative aim by describing the called-out action as an instance of 
act-type X. To achieve the second communicative aim, the Caller does two things. First, she 
explicitly asserts certain morally salient information. Morally salient information consists of non-
moral propositions which are morally relevant to the permissibility of the called-out action. 
Typically, the non-moral propositions are sociological, historical, psychological, or first-person 
experiential propositions about the consequences of acts of type X. It may be about the actual or 
predicted effects of the called-out action or of acts of that type. Second, the Caller implies that in 
her moral judgment, the morally salient information bears negatively on act-type X in a way that 
warrants an unfavorable moral conclusion about the permissibility of act-type X. For example, it 
is morally relevant if an action causes pain. So when she is calling someone out for that action, 
the Caller asserts the non-moral proposition “your action caused pain.” She describes the 





moral judgment that this non-moral information should lead the Callee to conclude that the 
called-out action was impermissible.  
On its own, the morally salient information is morally inert. When accompanied by the 
implied negative moral judgment, morally salient information can prompt the Callee to recognize 
the negative moral consequences of her action. Negative moral consequences include things like 
how the called-out action makes the Caller or others feel, that it invokes or cues certain 
ideological background assumptions, biases, or stereotypes, or how it may license other moral 
transgressions. And the implied moral judgment suggests that the called-out action is therefore 
morally impermissible. For instance, the Caller might assert the non-moral information that 
talking about “blood and soil” in conversations about immigration policy may make others more 
likely to discriminate against non-white immigrants. In addition to what she asserts, the Caller 
might also imply something like the following moral judgment: acts of the type ‘discrimination 
against non-white immigrants’ is morally wrong, and the wrongness of that act-type bears on the 
permissibility of the act-type that the called-out action instantiated.  
 In the Hunter example, Gray might accomplish her communicative aims in the following 
way. First, Gray shows Hunter that the called-out action can be described as an instance of the 
act-type ‘cultural appropriation.’ Second, Gray makes the explicit assertion of morally salient 
information, along with the implicit moral judgment that the morally salient information is 
evidence that the act-type which the called-out action instantiates is morally impermissible. Here, 
the morally salient information might be that instantiations of the act-type ‘cultural 
appropriation’ are causally implicated in perpetuating the systemic oppression of those whose 
culture is appropriated. The implied moral judgment would be that it is wrong to perpetuate 





morally wrong, then the callout should prompt Hunter to reconsider the moral permissibility of 
her action. In this case, Hunter agreed that cultural appropriation was morally wrong but denied 
that her act was an instance of it. Hunter argued that because the name “Tecumseh” was 
suggested by Tania (a Nuu-chah-nulth woman) and approved by the yarn dyer Candice English 
(whose maternal family are Blackfeet), Hunter’s action was morally permissible.   
On either the moral fact view or the morally salient information view, the Caller is 
responding to what she perceives as an information asymmetry. That is, the Caller thinks she has 
information that the Callee either lacked entirely or did not appreciate fully. The Caller supposes 
that had the Callee known or properly appreciated this information, then the Callee would not 
have transgressed. The nature of the asymmetry depends on our view of the informational 
content of callouts. On the moral fact view, the Caller knows some moral facts that the Callee 
does not. On the morally salient information view, the Caller knows some non-moral information 
that the Callee does not. Through the callout, the Caller aims to transmit whatever morally 
relevant information she thinks the Callee was missing. The Caller expects that having this 
morally relevant information will be sufficient to show the Callee why they should not act that 
way in the future.  
 
The Problem with the Moral Fact View  
Now that I have explained two views of informational content, I want to show why we 
should adopt the morally salient information view. On the moral fact view, a callout is an item of 
pure moral testimony (McGrath, 2009, 322). The Caller announces what she takes to be the 
correct moral conclusion about the type of act that the called-out action instantiated. But the 





problem for moral testimony will be a problem for the moral fact view. It is widely thought that 
there are issues with moral testimony and moral deference, but there are competing views of 
what moral testimony and moral deference are. I want to address at least one form of two of 
those worries, though they may not be the most serious objections to moral testimony.  
The first problem if callouts are items of moral testimony is epistemic. There is little 
agreement about whether moral testimony can convey moral knowledge at all. One objection to 
moral testimony that may pose a problem for the moral fact view is that moral testimony can 
convey propositional knowledge but not moral understanding. Even if moral testimony can 
convey some sort of moral knowledge, some people still doubt that this could be sufficient for 
moral improvement. Call the view that moral testimony cannot transmit moral understanding 
moderate pessimism. According to moderate pessimism, callouts educate the Callee by 
transmitting propositional knowledge about moral matters. Consider the moral proposition “I 
ought to be kind to others.” If I have propositional knowledge of this proposition, then I know 
that I ought to act in a certain way, namely in the kind way. I may even be able to give reasons 
why I ought to act this way: kindness maximizes happiness, conduces to treating people as ends 
in themselves, or is what guides the virtuous person. But my propositional knowledge that I 
ought to be kind is not actionable. On its own, propositional knowledge can’t tell me how to be 
kind or even what to look for to determine what the kind action is in a particular case. To know 
how to act on the moral proposition, I need to understand it. In this way, moral understanding is 
more like a skill or capacity (Hills, 2013, 555). To understand this moral proposition means that I 
have a sense of what it means to be kind, and what features kind actions tend to have. It may also 
involve my developing a sensitivity towards how considerations of kindness interact with other 





Moderate pessimists can agree that calling out can transmit propositional knowledge in a 
way that counts as moral education but deny that calling out serves a valuable function (Crisp, 
2014, 133). If callouts are limited to conveying knowledge of moral propositions, this suggests 
that the Callee will have difficulty responding productively to the criticism (Hills, 2013, 555). 
Without the additional information that comes with understanding, it is difficult for the Callee to 
identify the negative moral features of the called-out action in a way that may help guide her in 
other situations. 
The second problem for the moral fact view is that even if moral testimony can convey 
moral knowledge, many philosophers argue it would be problematic for the Callee to accept the 
Caller’s moral testimony. Deference to moral testimony might be problematic for several 
reasons. On most views of moral facts, everyone has equal access to moral facts (Bailey, 2017,  
879). Given that everyone has the same level of access to moral facts, accepting the Caller’s 
moral testimony is impermissible because the Callee would be outsourcing the work of moral 
inquiry. The process of moral inquiry is valuable in itself, not just as a means to holding the right 
moral beliefs. Thus, by outsourcing that work the Callee does herself a disservice (McGrath, 
2009, 322).   
The picture is more complicated on the morally salient information view, but also more 
promising. The literal content asserted in a callout consists of non-moral propositions. This 
means that callouts are not what McGrath calls pure moral testimony, and therefore callouts are 
not items of moral testimony at all. Unlike on the moral fact view, the Caller only explicitly 
asserts the non-moral propositions. Her moral judgment about the bearing of the non-moral 
propositions on the permissibility acts of type X is implied. In a sense, the Caller suggests that 





ultimately left to draw her own moral conclusions. As I’ve described it, the morally salient 
information view has three advantages over the moral fact view.  
First, on the morally salient information view, callouts are items of factual testimony. 
Unlike moral testimony, we think factual testimony can convey knowledge, and that deference to 
factual testimony is unproblematic. Moreover, it is possible for the Caller to have better access to 
the sort of morally salient information which she explicitly asserts (Bailey, 2017, 879). For 
instance, suppose the Callee used a racial slur. If the Caller is a member of the group targeted by 
the slur, and the Callee is not, then the Caller is better positioned to access morally salient 
information about the effects of that slur for a member of the group it targets. Since the Callee is 
not a member of the group targeted by the slur, she cannot access that information directly 
(Thomas, 1998, 364).9 Alternatively, the Caller may just happen to be better positioned than the 
Callee to access the morally salient information directly. For example, the Caller is better 
positioned than the Callee to directly access morally salient information about what it is like to 
be unhoused if the Caller happens to be unhoused. Since the Callee could also end up unhoused, 
it is possible for the Callee to access that morally salient information directly. Here, the barriers 
to direct access are a matter of the Callee’s circumstances.10 The morally salient information 
view also avoids the second issue that I said faces moral testimony. It is uncontroversial that 
some people are better positioned than others to access certain non-moral facts directly (see 
 
9 Even if the Callee were to pose as a member of the targeted group, her experience hearing the slur is qualitatively 
different than the Caller’s experience. She hasn’t lived her entire life as a member of the targeted group. And 
knowing that she can stop posing as a member of the targeted group at any time means that she is not forced to 
reckon with the slur, or the bigotry the slur represents, as long-term problems. 
 
10 The Callee may or may not be culpable for these barriers (or for failing to break them down). I’m not interested in 
questions about culpable or non-culpable ignorance here, though I acknowledge that if the Callee is culpably 





Thomas, 1998, and McGrath, 2009). As such, we regard deference to factual testimony as 
unproblematic. Because callouts are items of factual testimony, rather than moral testimony 
when we adopt the morally salient information view, there is nothing problematic when the 
Callee defers to the Caller.  
Of course, this is not the whole story of either view. The moral fact view may have 
redeeming features which I’ve omitted, and the morally salient information view may have 
problems that I’ve neglected. But the morally salient information view lets us avoid the problems 
facing the moral fact view. This suggests that we should reject the moral fact view in favor of the 
morally salient information view.   
 
Callouts as Moral Education Mechanisms  
If what I have said above is right, and we adopt the morally salient information view, 
then we are in a good position to describe how callouts serve as moral education mechanisms. 
The basic idea is that by conveying morally salient information, the Caller gives the Callee 
reasons why the Callee should judge that the called-out action was morally impermissible. When 
successful, moral education begets moral improvement. To say that callouts educate the Callee is 
to say that the Caller provides the Callee with a resource (morally salient information) which 
helps the Callee to be more moral in some respect. Here are two kinds of moral improvement 
that callouts might beget when a callout succeeds in morally educating the Callee. Moral 
education may result in transformative moral growth at the level of the Callee’s character. In this 
case, when calling out works then the Callee becomes a different sort of person. She doesn’t 





differently than she did before being called out.11 Alternatively, moral education may cause the 
Callee to recalibrate particular moral judgments. The scope of revisions is aggressively local. 
Rather than a moral overhaul, the Callee revises particular moral judgments about the called-out 
action. She may make adjustments to her deliberative process, perhaps by giving greater weight 
to a feature which the Caller suggested deserved greater deliberative weight.   
It is hard to imagine how calling out as currently practiced could – by itself – prompt the 
sort of pervasive character improvement involved in transformative moral growth. The Callee 
may trust the Caller enough to revise some of her local moral judgments. But callouts are 
paradigmatically one-shot interactions and occur between strangers; the lack of trust between the 
Caller and Callee could be a barrier to the Callee seeking out more global moral growth. A 
callout may contribute to the sort of deeper self-interrogation that precipitates wholesale 
character transformation. But whether callouts can prompt that sort of transformation on their 
own is an open question that must be settled empirically. It may also be unfair to expect broader 
moral growth given that morally salient tends to be more particular to the situation. Broader 
moral growth might require the Callee to take the particular information and generalize it before 
she can apply her new knowledge more widely. Prior to the callout, the Callee either lacked or 
failed to appreciate this new morally salient information. As such, it might be too much to expect 
that the Callee will have the capabilities to generalize and apply the morally salient information 
that way, at least right off the bat.   
Callouts prompt the Callee to recalibrate certain moral judgments which are closely 
related to her judgment about the permissibility of the called-out action. On my view, calling out 
 
11 The particular details of what moral transformation entails will depend on one’s first-order moral view, so I don’t 





has limited efficacy.12 The fact that calling out involves factual rather than moral testimony helps 
explain why this is the case. If callouts only convey propositional non-moral knowledge, then 
there are limits to what the Caller may reasonably expect from the Callee in the wake of the 
callout. If she expects her callout will precipitate a moral transformation in the Callee, that is 
unfair to the Callee. For this expectation to be reasonable, the Caller would have to take on 
additional obligations to the Callee. Namely, the Caller bears some responsibility for putting the 
Callee in a position to develop a richer appreciation of the called-out action’s morally significant 
features (Thomas, 1993, 93). This suggests another reason for preferring the morally salient 
information view to the moral fact view. On the morally salient information view, callouts may 
convey richer information, and more of it. By asserting the non-moral propositions and implying 
a certain moral judgment about that information, the Caller aims to draw the Callee’s attention to 
those morally significant features of the called-out action in virtue of which she judges it to be 
morally wrong. Suppose the called-out action has caused certain people to suffer unnecessarily. 
A report about that suffering that is sufficiently descriptively rich will tend to illustrate better 
why acts that cause suffering are morally impermissible (Thomas, 1998, 378). Moreover, the 
Callee may find those descriptions of the suffering more compelling reasons to revise certain 
moral judgments than the reasons she would get from a straightforward moral proposition.  
Despite the limited efficacy of callouts, the practice of calling out has uniquely valuable 
benefits. The unique power is a function of the public nature of calling out. There are at least two 
ways that the publicity feature is important to my positive argument. First, because callouts are 
public, audience members play a role in lending credibility to the Caller’s assertion. Second, the  
 
12 There is always the possibility that the Callee will take the callout as an opportunity for additional moral 
introspection and will end up experiencing moral transformation. But in general, the best we can expect is to prompt 





public nature of calling out is what makes it possible for Callers to engage in moral criticism at 
all. For now, I’ll focus on the first reason. I am not the first to key in on the importance of 
publicity to the moral value of calling out. I noted earlier that Billingham and Parr also think 
publicity is valuable. But publicity plays a slightly different role on my view than it does on 
Billingham and Parr’s view. There are at least two ways the publicity of callouts can contribute 
to their efficacy as moral education mechanisms. The more people who contribute morally 
salient information that supports the Caller’s initial moral judgment, the harder it is for the Callee 
to dismiss the callout or deny that it merits serious consideration. The Caller may inspire 
audience members to contribute their own morally salient information. This could be their own 
experiences of being directly targeted by the called-out action, the problematic origins of the 
ideologies or stereotypes cued, or their own process of moral growth which led them to reject 
acts of type X. By enriching the pool of morally salient information for the Callee to consider, 
the audience aids the process of moral education by painting a richer picture of the moral 
considerations that bear on the moral permissibility of the called-out action.13 
Once we appreciate that callouts are limited in this way, we can explain why calling out 
may feel futile. On my view, it sometimes is futile. Calling out will be ineffective as a 
mechanism of moral education when the Callee is a dispositional bigot. Callouts may be less 
effective if the Caller and Callee have an antecedent disagreement about which act-types are 
morally impermissible. If the Callee disagrees with the Caller that acts of type-X are morally 
impermissible, then the Caller needs to convince the Callee that acts of type-X are morally 
impermissible before she could accomplish the two communicative aims of calling out.  
 
13 I am unsure if the audience member’s contributions would be callouts in their own right (they certainly could be), 






Sometimes it will be possible for the Caller to do this. But if the Callee is dispositionally bigoted, 
it is unlikely that the Caller will convince the Callee that acts of type-X are morally 
impermissible. Failing to convince the Callee of that makes it unlikely that the Caller will 
convince the Callee that the called-out action was morally impermissible. The Caller’s 
justification for judging that the called-out action is morally impermissible is that the called-out 
action instantiates a morally impermissible act-type. If the Callee disagrees that acts of that type 
are morally impermissible, they will not agree that instantiations of that act-type are also morally 
impermissible. This means that callouts are unlikely to succeed as moral education mechanisms 
when the Callee is dispositionally bigoted since the dispositional bigot will not be receptive to 
morally salient information since she has already decided that acts of type X are morally 
impermissible.  
Contrary to portrayals of calling out as an antagonistic practice, or one that reveals the 
Caller’s disdain for the Callee, calling someone out is an optimistic act. When calling out is a 
means of moral education, like I have suggested, we will only call people out if we think they 
can improve morally. Far from writing the Callee off as a lost cause, the Caller who aims to help 
the Callee improve morally must think that the Callee is (or could be) receptive to considering 
new, morally salient information in a good-faith way.  
 
Objection to the Moral Education Argument 
Next, I’ll consider an objection to the moral education argument. This objection comes 
from the literature on blame. The objection is that the Caller must (but rarely does) meet certain 





occupy, and is recognized as legitimately occupying, the role of Caller.14 On standard accounts 
of standing, if someone lacked standing to call out, but did so anyway, then that callout was 
morally inappropriate. When a callout is morally inappropriate, standard accounts say the Callee 
is entitled to reject the substance of the callout pro forma (Bell, 2013, 264).15  
There are different things in virtue of which one might have standing to call out. I’ll look 
at two conditions on standing that critics of calling out may suggest Callers typically lack. On the 
first condition,  standing requires the Caller was harmed by the called-out action. On the second 
condition, standing requires the Caller have access to certain information about the Callee. In 
response to the harm-based standing condition, I’ll argue that when the called-out action violates 
a moral norm, anyone who is also subject to that norm will have standing even if they were not 
harmed. In response to the epistemological standing condition, I’ll argue that information about 
the Callee’s reasons, intentions, and motivations is not essential to the moral permissibility of 
calling out.  
Some suggest that having standing requires that the Caller is harmed by the called-out 
action. What counts as being harmed by the called-out action is difficult to pin down. But unless 
we take a highly expansive view of what counts as being harmed, Callers typically do not fulfill 
this harm-based standing condition because they were not clearly harmed. Critics of calling out 
might favor a harm-based standing condition because it should reduce the frequency of calling 
 
14 In the case of calling out, we might think that in addition to standing to publicly morally criticize via callout, 
Callers must have standing to perform whatever other functions callouts perform, e.g., the Caller must also have 
standing to morally educate. Whether or not additional standings are necessary to legitimate a callout probably 
depends on the relationship between the minimal definition of calling out and the functions that callouts – 
understood in the minimal way – can perform. 
 
15 The focus is on the moral (im)propriety of criticizing when the critic lacks standing,  rather than on the 
(in)felicitousness of criticism when the critic lacks standing. I am not sufficiently familiar with literature on 





out. This condition will limit the pool of eligible Callers to those whom the Callee harmed. It 
would also eliminate the practice of callouts for so-called victimless moral transgressions. If 
there is uncertainty about who was harmed or what counts as being harmed in a particular case, 
the burden is presumably on the potential Caller to show that she meets the harm-based standing 
condition. 
Standing could also be a function of the Caller and Callee’s relationship.16 McKeirnan 
suggests an epistemic condition for standing, on which the Caller’s relationship to the Callee 
must permit the Caller epistemic access to certain information about the Callee. McKeirnan 
suggests that the relationship needn’t be personal. Still, there is a certain level of familiarity (if 
not intimacy) that seems necessary for insight into what kind of person the Callee is.17 I call this 
information about what kind of person the Callee is contextual information. Contextual 
information includes things like the intent behind and reasons for the called-out action, as well as 
relevant facts about the Callee’s character (McKeirnan, 2016, 146). 
Suppose a newscaster says “Young Black men have historically been violent.” If she 
meant to say “violent,” that is importantly different than if she actually meant to say “violated.” 
The appropriate response if she intended to say “violent” may be inappropriate if she just got 
tongue-tied trying to say “violated.” Given an epistemic condition for standing like McKeirnan’s, 
only people who have a relationship that allows them epistemic access to contextual information 
 
16Although I’ll be talking about calling out, I want to explicitly flag that McKeirnan is not. 
 
17McKeirnan’s thinking is a scholarly gloss on a common objection raised against callouts by non-philosophers. 
Oftentimes, a Callee (or her supporters) will respond that because the Caller and audience doesn’t know the Callee’s 
heart, they don’t have the right to accuse the Callee of malintent. For a recent example of this kind of defense, see 
New Orleans Saints quarterback Drew Brees’ statement responding to outrage at his comments on people who don’t 






about the newscaster have standing to call her out. Depending on the sort of relationship 
necessary for epistemic access, this group likely includes her friends, family, and colleagues. It 
may include people to whom she has no personal relationship but frequently interacts with, like 
the barista she chats with every morning while getting coffee.   
There is something intuitively attractive about this epistemic standing condition. At the 
very least, having contextual information seems practically useful for the Caller, who could use it 
to improve the chance her callout will succeed. There are other reasons that critics of calling out 
should like this condition. Calling out is paradigmatically practiced between strangers. And in 
general, the Caller and Callee won’t have the sort of relationship that will satisfy this epistemic 
standing condition (Seim, 2019, 20). This epistemological condition for standing would reduce 
the frequency of callouts by limiting the pool of eligible Callers to those with the right sort of 
relationship to the Callee. But since the Caller has access to contextual information, there might 
be a corresponding rise in the success rate of calling out. 
I’ll give two reasons for thinking that Callers have standing, at least on the views of 
standing discussed here. In response to the harm-based standing condition, I’ll argue that if the 
Callee violated a universal moral norm, anyone who is also subject to that norm has standing to 
criticize others who violate it – regardless of whether they were harmed. And in response to the 
epistemic standing condition, I’ll suggest that contextual information doesn’t bear on whether 
calling out is permissible or advisable.  
To respond to the harm-based standing condition, we can turn to Macalaster Bell’s 
argument that standing conditions only apply when certain types of moral norms are violated.18 
Bell suggests that standard accounts of standing are problematic because they don’t distinguish 
 





between different types of norms. On standard accounts, the requirements for standing to call out 
are the same whether one is calling out a violation of a universal moral norm or a violation of a 
relationship-specific moral norm. For Bell, this leads to implausible results. For instance, on a 
typical harm-based standing condition, I will lack standing to call out the perpetrator of racially 
motivated violence if I was not harmed. If we had a slightly more permissive definition of 
“harm,” a standard account could say that I lack standing if I am not a member of the group 
targeted by the violence.  
Bell suggests the following remedy: we should distinguish violations of universal moral 
norms from violations of relationship-specific moral norms. Criticizing violations of 
relationship-specific moral norms requires standing, whereas criticizing violations of universal 
moral norms does not. Bell thinks we can treat these kinds of norms differently because the 
former sort of norm only applies to certain people. A relationship-specific moral norm applies 
only to those in a particular relationship. Relationships are partly constituted by certain norms, 
and some of those norms are unique to that relationship.19 Relationship-specific moral norms 
govern what we owe to one another in virtue of standing in a particular relationship to each other 
(Bell, 2013, 277). Consider the following example from Bell: suppose Aramis and Blaise hold 
each other to certain standards of artistic integrity. It is appropriate for Aramis and Blaise to hold 
each other to standards of artistic integrity because their relationship is partly constituted by a 
norm about artistic excellence. But it might be inappropriate for a third person, Cam, to hold 
Blaise responsible for failing to maintain her artistic integrity (Bell, 2013, 277).   
In contrast, universal moral norms are norms to which we are all subject. They govern 
 
19 By “unique” I mean that the norm governs only the parties to the relationship. Multiple different relationships 
could be partly structured by the same relationship-specific moral norms, but the relationship specific moral norm 
governing a friendship between A and B does not govern how A or B treats C or D even if C and D’s friendship is 





what we owe to each other as persons, regardless of what relationship we have to them. For 
instance, Aramis can hold Blaise responsible for Blaise groping Cam because Blaise violated a 
universal moral norm against unwanted sexual touching (Bell, 2013, 280). Bell thinks we are in a 
position to hold responsible people who violate universal moral norms because the moral climate 
of our community depends on the behavior of each member (Bell, 2013, 271). A moral 
community where moral transgressions proliferate is not a desirable community, intrinsically or 
instrumentally. Even if the Caller is not harmed, she has an interest in how her community 
responds to violations of universal moral norms when those violations degrade the moral 
conditions.20 
In response to McKeirnan’s epistemic standing condition, I suggest that contextual 
information typically isn’t necessary for the callout to perform the morally valuable function of 
helping the Callee improve morally. As long as it is possible to describe and judge the called-out 
action without reference to the contextual information about the Callee, then it is possible for the 
Caller to achieve her communicative aim. To see how this is possible, consider the following 
example:  
Alex asks Carlin the following question: “are your locs supposed to look messy, or are 
you just lazy?” In response, Carlin calls Alex out, saying: “that question is based in racist 
stereotypes, and perpetuating racist stereotypes perpetuates racial inequality.”   
 
If Alex did not mean to cue or perpetuate a racist stereotype, her question was unintentionally 
racist. If Alex did mean to cue that racist stereotype, her question was intentionally racist. If 
Carlin meets McKeirnan’s epistemic standing condition, then she will be able to assess whether 
 
20 Moreover, being strict about harm as a condition on standing may mean it would be morally impermissible for the 
allies of those who were harmed to call out because the allies would lack standing. This shifts the burden of callouts 





Alex’s question was racist intentionally or unintentionally. But if she does not meet that 
condition, then Carlin is not entitled to assert that Alex’s action instantiated the act-type 
‘intentionally racist action.’ To be entitled to assert that Alex’s action instantiated the act-type 
‘intentionally racist action,’ Carlin would need access to contextual information about Alex that 
allowed her to assess Alex’s intentions. But even if Carlin lacks access to contextual information, 
Carlin can fairly say that Alex’s action instantiated the act-type ‘racist action.’ Under a 
description that is neutral with respect to Alex’s intent, a callout can still play a role in moral 
education because some morally salient information bears on the moral permissibility of Alex’s 
action whether or not it was intentionally racist. For instance, it seems appropriate in both cases 
for Carlin to share morally salient information about the ideological roots of the stereotype that 
locs are unhygienic.21 If Alex was intentionally racist, the callout might give Alex reasons to 
reject that stereotype.22 If Alex was unintentionally racist, the callout might help Alex see why 
the question was, in fact, racist. So callouts can function to morally educate even when the Caller 
lacks access to contextual information about the Callee.  
Given this, the epistemic standing condition should be unnecessary as long as it is possible to 
describe and categorize the called-out action without reference to intent.23 However, one might 
 
21 Alex may be a dispositional bigot. In that case, it might be appropriate to at least try to get her to care about 
relevant morally salient information even if it’s often futile. After all, you never know until you try! 
 
22 It might seem like if Alex was intentionally racist, then Alex is a dispositional bigot, and so calling Alex out 
would be futile. It seems possible to me that Alex could be intentionally racist without being a dispositional bigot, 
which is why I discuss the case where Alex was intentionally racist. If I am wrong, and one cannot be intentionally 
racist without also being a dispositional bigot, then there are two things we could say: (1) we could say that it is 
pointless or in some way inappropriate to call Alex out because doing so would be futile. Or we might say (2) there 
is still some value to be had by calling out dispositional bigots like Alex. 
 
23 Or at least, this is the case on the assumption that the Callee is concerned to avoid moral transgressions and she 





think that though moral education can be appropriate even in cases of ignorance or lack of ill-
intent, criticism is not appropriate. If it is inappropriate to criticize people for moral 
transgressions committed in ignorance or without ill-intent, then calling out would also be 
inappropriate. And if calling out is inappropriate in those cases, then it seems like we should 
want something like McKeirnan’s epistemic standing condition in place.  
In response to that worry, proponents of calling out can point out that it’s not always 
plausible that the Callee was non-culpably ignorant of the moral implications of the called-out 
action. For instance, it seems highly unlikely that Alex could grow up completely unaware of the 
existence of racism, or of why acts that instantiate the act-type ‘racist action’ are morally wrong. 
Some people will suggest that Alex is culpable for failing to educate herself about racism and 
investigating her own biases adequately. I am sympathetic to this line of thinking, but there is a 
more modest argument for why criticism may still be appropriate in cases of ignorance or lack of 
ill-intent. On that modest argument, someone may be liable to criticism for their action without 
necessarily being culpable.24 Even if we can tell a reasonable story that explains how Alex 
remained ignorant of the racist implications of her question, Alex may still be liable to criticism 
because she remained ignorant. With respect to certain moral norms, it seems unlikely as a 
matter of fact that someone could remain ignorant of the fact that there are such norms unless she 
was motivated to remain ignorant. Barring the rare case where the Callee has never before 
encountered the norm in question but not by her own design, the Callee is liable to criticism if 
 
24 One thing that may complicate this line of argument is if we are in what Cheshire Calhoun calls an “abnormal 
moral context.” In an abnormal moral context, only a fraction of the community has a certain piece of moral 
knowledge (Calhoun uses the example of first-wave feminists) and this moral knowledge hasn’t been disseminated 
broadly enough for us to be justified in saying that if someone is still ignorant of first-wave feminism, then they 
must have tried to remain ignorant. Whether we are in a normal or abnormal moral context depends on the moral 
issue we’re concerned with. If we are in an abnormal moral context, where the Caller is on the cutting edge of 





she is (or should have been) aware of the norm but failed to appreciate that she is governed by it, 
or to understand what it gave her reason to do in a particular case.  
McKeirnan is right that those who meet the epistemic standing condition may be better 
positioned to secure uptake from the Callee than those who don’t meet the condition. The Callee 
may trust people she knows more than strangers. Or someone who meets the epistemic standing 
condition may have a better sense for how to get the Callee to see the moral stakes. Practical 
considerations such as these are worth thinking about. But it is a mistake to think these practical 
considerations constitute normative standards for permissibility (Bell, 2013, 272). 
In this Section, I aimed to give a positive account of how calling out functions to morally 
educate the Callee, using resources from the literature on moral testimony. I argued that issues of 
standing are avoidable on my view. Next, I’ll present a stand-alone argument against the moral 
permissibility of calling out.  
 
4 Argument Against Calling Out: Disproportionately Harmful 
The harms of callouts can be manifold, multi-faceted, and far-reaching. Even the most 
hardline proponent of callouts cannot seriously deny this. In this Section I will advance an 
argument, which I later reject, on behalf of critics of calling out. Critics of calling out may argue 
that even if I am right about their benefits, the harms of calling out to the Callee render the 
practice morally impermissible. In the literature — popular and philosophical — devoted to 
criticisms of practices of public moral criticism (which includes calling out), people have keyed 
in on two recipients of potential harm. The first recipient is the Callee. In addition to the usual 
harms associated with being the target of criticism, callouts expose the Callee to certain other 





kinds of reactions from audience members, some of which may be harmful to her. Second, some 
critics hold that the moral community itself is a recipient of potential harm. They argue that the 
moral community is indirectly harmed by calling out because it is a practice that tends to silence 
certain kinds of speech and discourage certain actions (e.g., Tosi and Warmke, 2020). Since 
there is already a robust dialogue about how public moral criticism may harm the moral 
community, I will focus on presenting an argument that the harms to the Callee mean that the 
practice of calling out morally impermissible.25  
No case better illustrates the potential harms of calling out than that of Justine Sacco. 
Sacco’s viral infamy began when she tweeted “Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get AIDS. Just 
kidding. I’m white!” before boarding an 11-hour flight (Ronson, 2015). By one account, tens of 
thousands of people had retweeted or commented by the time Sacco landed. Reactions varied 
dramatically (Ronson, 2015). Of those who reacted to Sacco’s tweet, some people responded by 
calling Sacco out. 26 Sacco’s life changed dramatically in the wake of the reaction to the tweet. 
She was fired, ostracized by her family; she became known worldwide as ‘that woman who 
joked about AIDS.’  
Callouts can cause a wide variety of harms: psychological, financial, reputational, and 
social. They can be mild, severe, or – as in Sacco’s case – life-changing. Some of the more 
severe harms include threats to physical safety, being doxxed or stalked, receiving threats to 
 
25 See Grandstanding by Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke for an example. I think their argument can be refuted, 
but they make a strong case so others may disagree.  
 
26 I would have loved to use an actual example of a reply to Sacco’s tweet here. Because Sacco secured the services 
of a highly sophisticated online reputation management company (pro bono, after Ronson wrote about her 
experience), I have been unable to find examples of responses to Sacco’s tweet either in news reports or actual 
tweets archived in the open-access Wayback Machine. But my understanding from secondary sources is that at least 





themselves or their loved ones, and being fired (Adkins, 2019, 84). The Callee may experience 
debilitating physical or psychological effects. Her social standing may be diminished in 
professional and personal circles, and she may find herself ostracized or shunned. Some harms of 
being called out will be familiar even to people who haven’t been called out – for instance, the 
discomfort of being told that what we did was wrong or immoral.  
Exposing the Callee to these sorts of harms might make calling out a morally 
objectionable practice for several reasons. I will present an argument that says calling out is 
morally objectionable when the harms to the Callee are generally disproportionate to the severity 
of the called-out action. This argument was inspired by a remark in Radzik (2019). There, 
Radzik says that if informal social punishment centrally involves or inevitably leads to 
disproportionate harms for the punished, that is sufficient to reject that practice on moral 
grounds. Critics of calling out can argue that the same is true for calling out. If calling out 
inherently or inevitably leads to disproportionate harms for the Callee, that may be sufficient 
grounds to reject the practice of calling out. To be clear, the argument I’m presenting on behalf 
of critics of calling out is not that any particular callout is morally odious if it causes the Callee 
disproportionate harms or vice versa. I am presenting a more modest claim on behalf of the 
critic: if calling out inherently or regularly exposes the Callee to disproportionate harms, and we 
can’t reduce the risk of exposure, then there is a strong case for thinking that the practice of 
calling out is not morally valuable.  
For many critics, calling out is objectionable because it happens in public, and not 
because it is a practice of moral criticism. The critic argues that because callouts are public, this 
practice is uniquely likely to cause disproportionate harm to the Callee. Even if the criticism is 





calling out argues that the public nature of calling out changes the magnitude of harms for the 
Callee. I will look at three ways that this might happen: (1) harms may be magnified, (2) harms 
may be replicated, and (3) new kinds of harms become possible. This list is not meant to be 
exhaustive; there may be other ways that the public nature of calling out could change the 
magnitude of the harms to the Callee. The harms to the Callee may be disproportionate in one, 
some, or all of these ways.  
I’ll use the following example to illustrate the three ways that the public nature of 
callouts can result in disproportionate harm to the Callee:  
Afia lives in the European countryside during WWII rationing. She stops by the butcher 
to pick up meat. There is a long line, and while helping Cary, a hotelier, who is in front of 
Anna in line, Beryl the Butcher announces to those still waiting that the only thing left for 
sale is offal. Afia is aware Cary is cheating the ration system by falsifying hotel records 
to make it seem like they have more people to feed than are staying in the hotel. With the 
fake guests’ ration cards, plus those of their actual guests, Cary circumvents the rules to 
buy more meat than they’d be entitled to purchase. Afia calls Cary out for gaming the 
system.27   
 
Magnification28  
Cary might feel more or less the same sort of feelings whether she was privately 
criticized or publicly called out: humiliated or ashamed of being caught, upset at being criticized, 
or she’s failed to be sufficiently patriotic. The audience’s presence, and her awareness of their 
presence, may magnify her feelings, making them more intense. It can be distinctly distressing to 
experience strong emotions, especially strong negative emotions, in front of others. It does not 
need to be the case that anyone is actually watching the Callee; it is enough that the Callee thinks 
 
27 This example is based on a scene from an episode of the BBC show George Foyle’s War. 
28 Aitchison and Meckled-Garcia (2021) discuss the ampliative effect of publicity. They combine what I am calling 
“magnification” and “replication” under the header of “aggregate public effect.” See Aitchison and Meckled-Garcia 





that the audience is observing her. Psychological and social harms seem most liable to 
magnification, since all that is required for magnification is the presence of the audience. In 
general, the larger the audience, the greater the magnification of the harms. In this way, the 
Caller exposes the Callee to the possibility of harms that are disproportionate to the severity of 
the transgression just because she called her out rather than privately criticizing her.  
 
Replication  
When someone is called out, they are exposed to the audience as someone who 
committed a moral transgression. The audience may also play an active role in making the harms 
disproportionate by replicating the harms. To replicate the harm of the original callout is to 
repeat, restate or make a new contribution to the moral criticisms directed at the Callee. This may 
involve repeating what the Caller said, or they may endorse or reiterate the substance of the 
Caller’s moral criticism. The original callout makes possible and licenses the audience’s 
replicative acts. By replicating the original callout and its harms, the audience members can add 
to the overall burden of harm for the Callee. With each replication of the original callout, the 
audience gives the Callee another moral criticism that demands uptake. Some critics refer to this 
as “piling on.” Piling on describes cases where the audience members agree with, endorse, or 
reiterate the Caller’s moral judgment but don’t contribute anything new to the conversation (Tosi 
and Warmke, 2020, 45). Piling on is considered morally worse than replication that involves 
audience members making unique contributions to the dialogue.  
Once the audience reaches a certain size, the individual replications may count as an 
aggregated harm distinct from, and not reducible to, the sum of the individual replications 





contributions might be benign when considered in isolation. But when the Callee is the target of 
dozens or hundreds of moral criticisms, each of which is unobjectionable on its own, the initial 
callout that prompted subsequent criticisms may be objectionable because of the sheer volume of 
criticisms contributed by the audience.  
 
Possibility of New Types of Harms 
Some harms that the Callee may experience from being called out may only arise because 
of the public nature of calling out. The public nature of calling out makes harms like doxxing, 
organized campaigns inundating the Callee with threats, and stalking possible. These harms are 
so objectionable that any practice which reliably resulted in those sorts of harms would be 
difficult to justify. There is plausibly no moral transgression so severe such that harms like these 
would be proportionate. But the public nature of callouts means those sorts of harms can become 
live possibilities. There are several reasons for this. We may be psychologically prone to feeling 
emboldened by crowds and even encouraged to act badly. Or perhaps it’s just a numbers game: 
the larger the audience, the more likely it is that any particular person will be willing and able to 
inflict certain harms. This issue is particularly acute when callouts occur online. The perverse 
incentives of social media algorithms, low barriers to access, and anonymity incentivize more 
extreme behavior. And as the size of the audience increases, so too does the risk that an audience 
member will have the wherewithal and the disposition to harm the Callee. 
 
Upshot  
Even if we think that the Callee makes herself liable to some harms in virtue of her moral 





harms because. This is because, as Radzik points out, the Callee can only make herself liable to 
proportional harms. The onus is on the Caller to be aware that the public nature of calling out 
increases the risk that she exposes the Callee to the risk of disproportionate harms. More to the 
point, the Caller must be cognizant of the connection between audience-size and the likelihood 
that the Callee will be exposed to disproportionately severe harms (Tosi and Warmke, 2020, 45-
50). Proponents of calling out must explain how to defuse the worries expressed here by giving 
an account of calling out that includes a way to assess the severity of the Callee’s moral 
transgression and what would be proportional in terms of harms. That account must also tell us 
what, if any, responsibility the Caller bears for minimizing the risk of disproportionate harm to 
the Callee.  
 
Reply 
Sacco’s story has reached canonical status among critics of callouts. But this is a mistake. 
Stories like hers are taken to be paradigms of the practice simply because they are more familiar. 
But we are familiar with these cases because they are remarkable. Such cases are remarkable 
because the Callee experiences harms that are grossly disproportionate relative to the severity of 
the called-out action. Given how the practice is represented in the public conscience, we could be 
forgiven for thinking that callouts always, or often, end in severely disproportionate harms to the 
Callee. What receives less attention is that some of the most infamous Callees have rebuilt their 
lives despite what they went through. For instance, within a year of that tweet, Sacco had 





private life.29 Sacco’s story is not dispositive, but her experience suggests there is life after being 
called out. Her story is a reminder that we need to look at the practice of calling out as a whole 
rather than just the exceptional cases.  
There is a dearth of empirical work on calling out, so we can’t draw conclusions about 
whether, how, and to what extent Callees are harmed in mundane cases. Nor are we entitled to 
say that cases like Sacco’s are a rarity. But anecdotally, we can note that our experiences seem to 
social media posts don’t frequently go viral the way Sacco’s tweet did. And if reputational 
restoration, emotional recovery, and social reintegration are possible in the most severe cases, 
then those things should also be possible for the Callee in the aftermath of more mundane 
callouts.  
Because of its public nature, calling out involves exposing the Callee to the risk of 
disproportionate harm. These risks are serious and should be treated as such. But I want to argue 
that this argument is not fatal to proponents of calling out. The critic who raises the above 
argument against calling out is right that proponents of calling out need to provide an account of 
calling out that includes a way to identify, assess, and mitigate the risk of harm to the Callee. 
Public moral criticism is an old practice, of which calling out is a more recent iteration. Because 
it is a relatively new practice, the fact that proponents don’t have a reply to the argument that I 
presented in this Section shouldn’t surprise us.  
Still, the critical argument presented in this Section puts serious pressure on proponents 
to give an account of calling out that acknowledges the risk of disproportionate harm to the 
Callee and suggests best practices to reduce that risk. If we learn that calling out often harms the 
 
29 Sacco had some advantages that might make her story atypical: she was a well-educated white woman with the 
means to spend time volunteering rather than seeking a new job and the knowledge she had acquired from working 





Callee in disproportionate ways as an empirical fact, then the pressure to give such an account 
will be even greater.  But at the very least, it is too early to conclude that proponents of calling 
out cannot develop a way to identify, assess, and mitigate the risk of disproportionate harm to the 
Callee.  
In this Section, I advanced an argument that the critic of calling out could make, on 
which calling out is morally impermissible because calling out disproportionately harms the 
Callee. I suggested that the proponent of calling out should concede that critics may be correct 
about the harm to the Callee, but I denied that this is a serious worry for proponents of calling 
out. I think the critic is right to demand an account of calling out that includes a set of best 
practices for avoiding disproportionately harming the Callee. But I also said that we shouldn’t be 
concerned that proponents of calling out haven’t offered such an account of calling out. I hope to 
have shown that the moral status of calling out is complex. Next, I will conclude by suggesting 
that calling out is morally valuable because it has unique benefits that are hard to replicate, given 
certain contingent features of our social reality.  
 
5 Conclusion 
I want to close by revisiting the role I envision for callouts in order to explain their 
distinct value and their advantages as a practice of moral criticism. As a reminder, I started this 
project with the idea that the practice of calling out has been unfairly maligned. Until now, the 
debate on the moral permissibility of this practice has been beset by confusion about the target 
phenomena. Different thinkers burden the concept with different sorts of baggage. I started with 
what I take to be the bare minimum features of calling out. I defined calling out as a practice of 





who committed a particular act that was held to violate moral norms. I argued that calling out is a 
morally valuable practice because callouts serve as a valuable moral education mechanism. I 
presented, and ultimately rejected, a critical argument that calling out is morally impermissible 
because it exposes the Callee to disproportionate harm.  
I’ve argued that calling out is both morally permissible and the source of unique moral 
value. To conclude my argument that calling out has unique moral value, I’ll address the second 
way that publicity is important to my positive account. Some people think that a world where 
criticism is privately communicated would be preferable to a world where calling out is morally 
permissible. But want to suggest that the public nature of calling out is what makes it possible for 
Callers to engage in moral criticism at all. Some people have proposed an alternative practice of 
criticism, which is referred to as calling in. Calling in is the private analog to calling out. But if 
we say that only calling in is permissible, then most moral criticisms that would have been made 
as callouts won’t be made at all. To see this, suppose we said that moral criticism was only 
permissible when communicated in private. Then it would be a prerequisite for a permissible 
criticism that the criticizer can communicate privately with the object of their criticism. One 
predictable consequence of this is that calling out will only be permissible if the Callee is 
someone we know.  
We are, as a society, less likely to form relationships with people who are different from 
us. Those who are relatively privileged may not even recognize that their lives are constrained in 
this way, or that their complacent insularity can have profoundly unjust consequences for others. 
I don’t mean to suggest that privilege is static or that someone may be privileged in one respect 
but not in others. Privilege is complex and dynamic, as are the ways that the intersections of 





the complacent inattention or ignorance of others can have life or death consequences. Calling 
out is a way for people in that latter group, or their allies, to communicate important morally 
salient information to people in the former group.  
In fact, we seem to prefer to stay in our ideological comfort zones (Bailey, 2017, 880). 
Even in a less-polarized social and political climate, people naturally gravitate toward those with 
a similar worldview. In the social media age, the results of this are called echo chambers or filter 
bubbles. But people try to create similar ideological boundaries offline as well. Think of white 
flight, redlining, or barring trans people from using the bathroom or locker room that aligns with 
their gender identity. Again, these phenomena are complex, and are not just examples of 
privileged people cultivating an ideological comfort zone by excluding or avoiding people who 
aren’t like them. The people we know who can privately criticize us likely have access to 
morally salient information that is similar to what we can access. Sometimes people ‘like us will 
have access to new morally salient information because they sought it out or have been called out 
themselves. The morally salient information we get from people like us will often reinforce our 
initial belief that our action was morally permissible. The possibility of moral improvement 
requires breaking out of the echo chamber by finding (or being confronted with) new morally 
salient information held by people who see things differently than we do. Whether intentional or 
accidental, many of us fail to appreciate what life is like for people who aren’t like us. This is 
especially true of those who are relatively privileged in a given society. Because it is public, 
calling out is a means by which people who would often be ignored or overlooked – particularly 
by those with relatively more privilege – can grab the attention of people who are otherwise 
socially and ideologically insulated from the negative consequences of their actions on others. 





and Callee wouldn’t otherwise interact. 
Contingent features of our social reality make it difficult to acquire new morally salient 
information unless we actively seek it out. And the majority of would-be-Callers have no 
alternative mechanism for communicating with the target of their moral criticism. By providing a 
way for us to morally criticize people we cannot speak to privately, callouts challenge the notion 
that privilege and power can shield people from the consequences of their actions. Because they 
function as moral education mechanisms, callouts play a role in mitigating culpable and non-
culpable ignorance of important morally salient information. No practice of private moral 
criticism can match the reach that calling out has in virtue of its publicity. If we think sharing 
morally salient information with others is a valuable practice, we should be very reticent to 
accept that moral criticism must be private. And practices like public shaming or informal social 
punishment don’t seem well-positioned to replicate the moral education function that I have 
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